#e4mXplains:  Fake orders, real censorship: How India's internet blocking regime is failing

India's internet censorship system has come under scrutiny following questions over the authenticity of court orders. Two High Court orders, which the respective courts could not authenticate, were used by the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) to direct internet service providers to block 129 websites.

A purported Rajasthan High Court order led to 34 websites being blocked in July, while another forged order, purportedly issued by the Allahabad High Court on August 14, resulted in directions to block 95 websites on September 2. The websites were linked to betting and the streaming of fake IPL matches. The Allahabad High Court subsequently ordered an FIR against unknown persons after discovering that no such case or judicial order existed.

The purported order even carried the court's seal, a judge's name and a QR code that led to a random webpage rather than an authenticated court record.

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In a separate development, Elon Musk-owned X Corp recently told the Delhi High Court that notices purportedly issued by Delhi Police against Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF) and Software Freedom Law Center (SFLC) were sent by an impostor.

The question is not merely how these documents were forged. It is why India's censorship architecture allowed them to become effective instruments of censorship.

A maze of authorities and laws

India's internet censorship framework is fragmented across MeitY, the Home Ministry, the Information and Broadcasting Ministry, DoT, state governments, police departments and courts. Each can initiate processes that result in online content being removed or websites being blocked.

The legal framework is equally complicated, spanning Sections 69A and 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, the IT Rules, 2021, BNSS notices and judicial orders. Each has different procedures and formats, leaving intermediaries navigating multiple channels of authority.

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The Sahyog platform may have streamlined the transmission of government requests, but digitising a fragmented process does not make it more transparent or legally sound.

As one digital policy expert, speaking anonymously, put it: "Digitising censorship without strengthening verification simply makes the machinery of arbitrary takedowns faster and more efficient."

Three hours to comply, no time to question

Under certain provisions of the IT Rules, intermediaries face a three-hour deadline for specified removal requests. This leaves little time to independently verify a communication, particularly when it purports to originate from a court or police authority.

The consequences of refusing a genuine government direction can be serious. Platforms therefore have an incentive to comply first and investigate later.

Yet the DoT's handling of the purported High Court orders raises an uncomfortable question: why was there no independent verification with the relevant court registry before websites were blocked?

An official-looking email appears to have been sufficient to set the machinery in motion. The government expects global technology companies to comply with its directions immediately, but its own verification processes appear far less rigorous.

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Secrecy protects the censor, not the censored

The problem extends beyond verification. Section 69A of the IT Act contains confidentiality provisions governing blocking directions and related proceedings. Consequently, those affected may not receive the orders or know precisely why their content has been restricted.

The X-IFF-SFLC episode illustrates this information imbalance. The organisations learnt about the purportedly fraudulent notices because X shared the communications with them. 

India's censorship framework also relies on John Doe and dynamic injunctions, particularly in copyright and piracy cases. These can facilitate requests to block additional websites and mirror domains. While legitimate judicial enforcement is necessary, the routine circulation of fresh blocking lists makes authentication even more important.

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Who pays for wrongful censorship?

The incentive structure is fundamentally skewed. Intermediaries risk losing safe-harbour protection under Section 79 of the IT Act if they fail to meet applicable legal requirements. But there is no equivalent, automatic accountability mechanism when they comply with a fraudulent direction.

Who compensates a website operator whose domain is blocked because of a forged order? Who takes responsibility for failing to authenticate it?

A former regulatory official, speaking anonymously, said: "The compliance system places the entire risk on intermediaries, while the authorities issuing defective directions rarely face comparable consequences."

Automation adds another layer of concern. Platforms acting on government flags without individual human review, alongside questions about the audit trail of notices submitted through Sahyog, underline the need for stronger oversight.

A big tech industry stakeholder said: "For platforms, over-compliance is the safer option. Ignoring a genuine order carries immediate risks; complying with a fake one rarely carries equivalent consequences."

Censorship as the default

MeitY has repeatedly expanded and revised digital regulations, but transparency around government takedown requests remains inadequate. The public lacks a comprehensive picture of how many requests are issued, rejected or subsequently challenged.

The solution is not complicated: publicly verifiable blocking orders, direct authentication with court registries, transparent reporting, human review and meaningful remedies against wrongful censorship.

While technology companies are expected to comply with government directions promptly, the authenticity of those instructions also needs to be verified.

When a fake court order can lead to an actual censorship directive, the issue goes beyond forgery to the systems that allow it to happen.

In India, internet censorship has become increasingly common, while questions around accountability remain.